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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT WOULD BARNETTE DO? 
In the much-revered West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette,1 the Supreme Court overturned precedent to hold that public 
schools cannot force students to stand and salute the flag.2 Justice Jackson 
noted in his majority opinion that the state cannot require “[c]ompulsory 
unification of opinion.”3 Dissenters and those with minority opinions and 
belonging to minority religions cannot be compelled, under the First 
 
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton Law School. Thanks to the faculty at the University of 
Cincinnati Law School for their helpful comments and participation in the faculty exchange during which 
a draft of this Essay was presented. I was also greatly enriched by the comments and contributions of the 
other participants in this fantastic symposium at Florida International University. Thanks as well to Dallan 
Flake and Leah Litman for reading portions of the draft. 
1 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Although Barnette is a celebrated opinion among legal scholars, the recent 
controversy over professional athletes kneeling for the pledge of allegiance demonstrates that many, 
including President Donald Trump, take issue as a policy matter with those who refuse to salute the flag. 
See Erica Goldberg, #TakeAKnee, Unity, and Public Versus Private Power, CROWDED THEATER (Sept. 
25, 2017), https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2017/09/25/takeaknee-unity-and-public-versus-private-power/. 
Of course, First Amendment rights often, and by design, protect speech the public disapproves of as a 
policy matter. 
2 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag 
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect 
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control.”). The Supreme Court overturned Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), an 8-1 
decision. 
3 Barnette, 319 U.S at 641. 
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Amendment, to participate in rituals as a symbolic way of forcing the 
population to espouse or project the same views.4 
At the 75th anniversary of Barnette, this bedrock principle is being 
tested in a very different context. Our current age is one of great fracture, and 
some claim that laws enacted to protect the vulnerable may marginalize and 
perhaps take away rights from the group that is generally considered the 
oppressor.5 Notably, to protect minority groups and those who have 
historically been oppressed, the state and federal governments have enacted 
legislation or undertaken state action that some claim compels them to 
espouse views with which they disagree. Laws designed to protect the 
historically marginalized are increasingly being challenged as compelling a 
new kind of orthodoxy.6 
As examples, Christian bakers are required to create custom-made 
wedding cakes for same-sex couples, even if they profess to be opposed to 
same-sex marriage,7 and state antidiscrimination laws also require 
photographers to photograph same-sex weddings.8 Public employees were 
required to contribute funds to unions, even if they are not union members, 
despite their political objection to the union’s activities.9 And, in the realm of 
free speech culture and perhaps First Amendment doctrine, public university 
professors and students at various universities are required to make 
statements and otherwise prove their commitment, within and outside of the 
classroom, to a particular, somewhat politicized understanding of diversity.10  
 
4 Id. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high 
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion 
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”). 
5 Laws enacted to punish and deter sexual abuse of children come to mind. Recently, the Supreme 
Court struck down as a First Amendment violation a North Carolina law prohibiting anyone on the sexual 
offender registry from accessing social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter. See Packingham v. 
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733–36 (2017). 
6 Another way of looking at this dynamic, as described by one scholar, is as a tension between 
disfavored minority and elite minority. See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment 
Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1992 (2016) (describing misunderstandings about “minority-
rights enforcement”). Whether a group is in the majority or minority does not materially affect my analysis 
here, but “disfavored-minority-elite-minority” is another possible way of understanding the cases I 
present. See id. 
7 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). The 
Court decided Matserpiece Cakeshop on the potentially sui generis ground that the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission showed animus towards religion, leaving for another day the compelled speech question. Id. 
at 1732; see also infra Part III.0I am not as convinced as the Supreme Court that statements by the 
Commission regarding the historical use of religion to justify bigotry are evidence of religious animus. 
8 Ellaine Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013). 
9 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466). 
10 See George Leef, Professors Shouldn’t Be Forced to Pledge Allegiance to “Diversity”, FORBES 
(May 10, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2017/05/10/professors-shouldnt-be-
forced-to-pledge-allegiance-to-diversity/#1b7719cd11cc (discussing how diversity statements are used to 
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This new era of compelled speech presents some meaningful differences 
with the classic Barnette paradigm. Barnette, written during World War II, 
addressed the impropriety of the government’s demanding nationalist 
sentiment. The majority based its decision on the constitutional 
impermissibility of coercing government-mandated unanimity of values,11 
especially in light of the fact that: (1) government coercion to “attain unity” 
for any belief causes increases strife among a population, as the stakes for 
who gets elected become very high;12 (2) forced loyalty to particular values 
leads to deadly consequences, especially under authoritarian regimes;13 and 
(3) Barnette does not involve a “collision” of rights—“the sole conflict is 
between authority and the rights of the individual.”14  
The new “good orthodoxy”15 cases do not involve the government’s 
command to show respect for its authority but involve instead states’ attempts 
to protect the very marginalized who might be (and indeed have been) targets 
of an authoritarian regime. Thus, these modern cases do involve a collision 
of rights and present a much lesser threat of the deadly consequences of an 
authoritarian regime.  
At the same time, these modern cases create potentially new 
marginalized groups, and new minority viewpoints, that may deserve 
protection from governmental overreach that creates “[c]ompulsory 
unification of opinion.”16 The new “good orthodoxy” may implicate the 
primary motivator of the Barnette Court: an aversion to mandated uniformity 
 
“weed out” scholars with a classical liberal view of pluralism emphasizing the universality of human 
experience over an ideology favoring group-based victimization and entitlements) (citing OR. ASS’N OF 
SCHOLARS, THE IMPOSITION OF DIVERSITY STATEMENTS ON FACULTY HIRING AND PROMOTION AT 
OREGON UNIVERSITIES (2017), http://www.oregonscholars.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/DiversityStatements_Rev16Mar17.pdf). 
11 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) (“National unity as an end 
which officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in question. The problem is whether under 
our Constitution compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement.”). 
12 Id. at 641 (“As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more 
bitter as to whose unity it shall be.”).  
13 Id. (“Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating 
dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”). 
14 Id. at 630 (“The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with 
rights asserted by any other individual. It is such conflicts which most frequently require intervention of 
the State to determine where the rights of one end and those of another begin.”). Perhaps this language 
was used to ensure that the First Amendment wasn’t marshalled in a way that threatened New Deal 
legislation. See Kessler, supra note 6, at 1970–71. Jackson used similar language in a dissent in a later 
case when he wrote that, “I think the limits [on religious freedom] begin to operate whenever activities 
begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public.” Id. at 1978 (quoting Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)).  
15 By placing “good orthodoxy” in quotations, I do not mean to suggest that the goals or even the 
policies of those seeking to promote the rights of historically marginalized groups are not good, but to 
question whether orthodoxy of views is ever a good thing. 
16 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. 
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of opinion, or even simply a show of unanimity of opinion,17 and the political 
strife that may ensue. 
Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Barnette, which seems not to have stood 
the test of time, also captures the view of those who wish to compel the new, 
good orthodoxy. Justice Frankfurter believed that Justice Jackson’s majority 
was overstepping its role and creating exceptions for religious groups who 
refuse to salute the flag, even though these religious groups have ample 
opportunities to express their views. This powerful dissent would have held 
that the state laws requiring the flag salute were “not in fact disguised assaults 
upon such dissident views.”18 Many of the objections currently lodged at the 
current crop of good orthodoxy cases were lodged against the Barnette 
majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter, yet those objections have not altered 
the enduring importance of Barnette.19 
Unification of opinion around values such as inclusion and tolerance are 
surely a better form of orthodoxy than forced patriotism. However, any 
attempt to compel allegiance to a particular view has potentially 
unconstitutional—and potentially dangerous—consequences. Consider 
academia, where not all professors agree with particular approaches to 
diversity or inclusion and do not wish to espouse a conception of diversity 
based on targeting particular groups for protective, and perhaps remedial, 
treatment. Their academic freedom, and their ability to debate important, 
open issues involving university priorities and use of the classroom may, 
depending on the way the diversity statements are assessed and the pressure 
placed on faculty members to echo the university’s views on the topic, be 
undermined when universities require them to submit diversity statements in 
order to receive promotion and tenure.20  
The compelled unanimity of opinion on a range of topics has, according 
to some, created ideological hegemony at our institutions of higher learning, 
leading to students who are more intolerant to and incapable of engaging with 
dissenting views. And yet, the school’s ultimate purpose is noble and 
important: tolerance and diversity for both those professors who have 
 
17 See id. at 633 (“It is also to be noted that the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires 
affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. It is not clear whether the regulation contemplates that 
pupils forego any contrary convictions of their own and become unwilling converts to the prescribed 
ceremony or whether it will be acceptable if they simulate assent by words without belief and by a gesture 
barren of meaning.”).  
18 Id. at 653. 
19 After Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation changed the political balance on the Supreme Court, 
the sentiments of Justice Frankfurter’s dissent, arguing for more judicial restraint, have experienced a bit 
of a resurgence, although not in the context of questioning the wisdom of Barnette itself. See Samuel 
Moyn, Resisting the Juristocracy, BOS. REV. (Oct. 5, 2018), http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/samuel-
moyn-resisting-juristocracy. 
20 See infra Part II.0 
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traditionally not been included in academia’s ranks and those students who 
felt they could not participate freely in class. 
Consider also National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. 
Becerra, a compelled speech case from October Term 2017.21 Becerra held, 
among other things, that requiring anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers to 
alert patrons to the fact that the state can provide low cost abortions violated 
the centers’ First Amendment rights against compelled speech. Becerra does 
not fit as neatly into the “good orthodoxy” paradigm because the medical 
services aspects of the case complicate any pure issues involving civil rights 
versus civil liberties. That said, as Justice Kennedy notes in his concurrence, 
California’s belief that its forced disclosure requirements are “forward 
thinking” demonstrates the problems with states believing that imposing 
hegemony of thought can ever truly be progressive.22  
This Essay addresses whether the courts should analyze compelled 
speech cases differently where states have enacted laws to promote equality 
values instead of the compelled nationalism in Barnette. The paper uses 
compelled speech by commercial actors, dues collected from government 
employees, and academia to illustrate the new ways states may unfairly 
penalize viewpoints while serving historically marginalized populations, 
who also need solicitude. I contrast the situation in Barnette to the current 
good orthodoxy context, where new groups of dissenters, holding minority 
opinions, are being created by laws designed to protect historically oppressed 
minority groups. Ultimately, I conclude that there is no such thing as good 
orthodoxy. Laws truly compelling speech in order to protect members of 
minority groups should be considered as constitutionally suspect as laws 
compelling speech to bolster majority opinion.  
However, the difference between Barnette and a case like Masterpiece 
Cakeshop cannot be ignored. Barnette leaves open whether its opinion should 
be read narrowly or broadly, and one way to honor Barnette is to carefully 
define what counts as protected speech. Some of the good orthodoxy cases 
do not involve pure speech and should not be analyzed as analogous to 
Barnette’s objection to forcing citizens “publicly to profess any statement or 
belief or to engage in any ceremony of assent to one.”23 Some of the new 
compelled speech cases merit strict scrutiny, and some do not. This Essay 
will detail how to distinguish the two types of cases. 
In those cases of “pure, protected speech”24 that do deserve strict 
scrutiny, I argue that the dignitary interests of minority groups protected by 
 
21 See 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
22 Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
23 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634. 
24 In First Amendment analysis, a continuum describes the spectrum from pure, protected speech 
to unprotected conduct. Verbal expressions in traditional media, such as art or political philosophy, are 
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state laws should not be considered as part of the strict scrutiny analysis. The 
very dignitary interests states are serving are the desire for individuals to 
proclaim that members of vulnerable minority groups deserve equal 
treatment. These dignitary interests are important and go beyond mere 
offense to a sense of equal status in the eyes of members of the community. 
However, the compelling interest the state asserts, when it uses the term 
dignitary interest, is the desire to compel uniformity of opinion or at least 
compel the appearance of uniformity of opinion. However, for cases that do 
not involve pure speech—such as expressive conduct cases—if states have 
other, conduct-related reasons for enacting their nondiscrimination and 
public accommodations laws, those interests will likely be able to overcome 
the intermediate scrutiny applicable to expressive conduct.  
Part II of this Essay catalogues modern examples of potential 
applications of West Virginia v. Barnette—public accommodations laws 
affecting expression, compelled union dues, and forced diversity statements 
in academia. That Part further discusses reasons that cases involving a state 
law’s protection of the historically underserved should be treated the same 
as, and reasons these scenarios should be treated differently from, Barnette. 
Part III articulates my own proposal: that courts treat “good orthodoxy” cases 
involving protection of the vulnerable the same as traditional compelled 
speech cases, but only when the targeted expression is pure speech, which 
will be the case less often in these modern cases. 
II. WHY THE “GOOD ORTHODOXY” MIGHT BE BAD 
After confronting a history rife with racism, forced internment, and both 
governmental and private discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities, 
women, and the LGBT community, states and the federal governments have 
 
the classic examples of pure speech. Symbolic communication made through conduct—like burning a 
draft card or having a parade—is expressive conduct, which receives intermediate scrutiny. See infra Part 
III.A. Conduct is fully regulable behavior, even if it communicates something. Murder is unprotected, 
entirely regulable conduct, even if the murderer is also expressing hatred for the victim. The main, and 
most appreciated, goal of the conduct of murder to end the person’s life, not to communicate a message 
or change the way the victim thinks or feels. However, even if a murder designed to terrorize a population 
were considered expressive conduct, not unprotected conduct, the government can easily survive 
intermediate scrutiny in its prohibition of murder. Id. Further, even some types of verbal expression 
become unprotected when they veer into the realm of conduct, such as threats that leave listeners in fear 
of physical harm or harassment that deprives a listener of her ability to maintain her job or receive her 
education. Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 721–22 (2016) 
(discussing how certain categories of speech are unprotected because the harms they impose closely 
resemble conduct harms); see also id. at 742 (discussing courts’ treatment of harassment). There are other 
exceptions to First Amendment protection for pure speech, or other types of speech that receive reduced 
First Amendment protection, but these categories are either considered historically unprotected by the 
courts or created for reasons other than their content or message. See id. at 693, 713, 717 (discussing ways 
in which unprotected categories of speech are created). 
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begun to pay more attention to the needs of minority groups. Governments 
trying to remedy the effects of systemic bigotry, which contributes to 
accumulated disadvantages and socio-cultural biases,25 do so both by 
changing their own treatment of these groups and by prohibiting private 
individuals from engaging in certain types of discrimination. These measures 
are then applied in ways that some now argue stifle their rights and interfere 
with the important right to express dissenting and counter-cultural opinions. 
In this Part, I catalog some of the laws or government policies that compel 
adherence to the currently accepted ideology in potentially unconstitutional 
ways. 
A. Cake Baking, Photograph Making, and Union Dues Taking 
In the commercial sector, business owners and employees have begun 
advancing compelled speech arguments against the application of laws 
designed to protect historically underprivileged groups.  
Non-discrimination and public accommodations laws, originally 
enacted during the civil rights era, prevent discrimination on the basis of 
membership in particular groups, including on the basis of sexual 
orientation.26 These laws have been critical in allowing people to move freely 
throughout the country and participate productively in the marketplace 
without worrying that they will not be able to find places of lodging, 
restaurants, and other necessary goods and services due to their membership 
in particular disfavored minority groups.27  
Some religious people have claimed these laws compel their acceptance 
and participation in certain practices to which they have a moral objection. 
As examples, the Supreme Court recently decided Masterpiece Cakeshop v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a case involving whether a self-styled 
“cake artist” may refuse to create a custom-designed cake for a same-sex 
wedding.28 The Supreme Court did not address the compelled speech issue, 
leaving it open for future cases.29 In what would likely have been a better 
 
25 See Barbara Reskin, Imagining Work Without Exclusionary Barriers, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
313, 330 (2002). 
26 See generally Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 631 (2016) (offering an account of the purpose and variety of states’ public accommodations 
laws and their interaction with religion). 
27 Id. at 662–65 (describing the individual, collective, and democratic purposes served by 
antidiscrimination laws). Antidiscrimination laws also serve to communicate messages of equal dignity 
and to prevent people from experiencing humiliation, id. at 664, although those purposes are more 
constitutionally suspect when they infringe upon an individual’s expressive rights. See infra Part III.B. 
28 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).  
29 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch are the only Justices who provided thoughts on the free speech 
issue. See id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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vehicle to decide the free speech issue, the Supreme Court previously denied 
certiorari in Ellaine Photography v. Willock, about whether a professional 
photographer has a First Amendment right to refuse to take photographs at 
same-sex weddings.30 A new iteration of Masterpiece Cakeshop, which 
involves a request to bake a pink and blue birthday cake that also celebrates 
a woman’s coming out as transgender, is also percolating through the 
litigation process.31 
In another context, states have authorized unions to require “fair share 
fees,” so that unions can perform their task of negotiating on behalf of 
employees.32 The history of unions is one of giving historically marginalized 
workers better protections and conditions against powerful employers.33 
Now, some claim that these union dues compel employees to support political 
causes with which they disagree.34 Even non-union members must pay dues 
that fund a union’s working against efficiency measures such as merit-based 
pay, for example. Employees may disagree with this stance, which they 
describe as political, especially for public sector unions, where each 
negotiation affects public policy and the public fisc.35 Here, the proffered 
compelled speech exists in the form of compelled union dues used to support 
union activity. Even a non-union employee in states requiring fair share fees 
must contribute “money for the propagation of opinions which he 
disbelieves.”36 
Many believe these types of good orthodoxy cases do not implicate the 
First Amendment right against compelled speech. To these scholars, the 
expansive use of the First Amendment in the commercial and employment 
 
30 See Brief for American Unity Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf 
(arguing that although cakes are not speech, application of public accommodations laws to traditional 
media like photography would violate the First Amendment).  
31 See Erica Goldberg, The Resurrection of Masterpiece Cakeshop – A Different Free Speech Issue 
and a Different Legal Landscape, CROWDED THEATER (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2018/09/17/the-resurrection-of-masterpiece-cakeshop-a-different-free-
speech-issue-and-a-different-legal-landscape/.  
32 Aaron Tang, Public Sector Unions, The First Amendment, and the Costs of Collective 
Bargaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 146–47 (2016) (explaining that the purpose of these fees is “to ensure 
sufficient financial support for unions in pursuit of the collective benefits that effective workplace 
representation can produce, both for public sector workers and the quality and efficiency of public services 
writ large.”). 
33 See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2016) (describing unions as a “core 
equalizing institution in politics and the economy.”). 
34 See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2461 (2018).  
35 This was the basis for the First Amendment challenge. Id.  
36 Tang, supra note 32, at 146 (quoting Thomas Jefferson’s idea that “to compel a man to furnish 
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical,” 
Irving Brant, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 1780-1787 354 (1948)). 
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sectors represents a so-called “new Lochner,” where business interests or 
political groups are using the First Amendment as a sword to advance their 
policy goals, instead of as a shield to simply protect their First Amendment 
rights against unconstitutional policy.37 Power, not reason, is the Court’s 
currency on these issues, some argue,38 and these First Amendment claims 
are a pretext for partisan advocacy for policy goals. Business organizations 
and think tanks bringing these First Amendment claims are advancing 
radically new First Amendment positions because of their business interests, 
they claim. Religious objections to neutrally applicable laws on the claim that 
the religious objector does not want to take part in a sexually immoral activity 
are not truly religious, but political, some argue.39 Indeed, “complicity-based 
conscience claims are asserted in society-wide conflicts by mobilized groups 
and individuals acting in coalitions that reach across religious 
denominational lines and in coordination with a political party.”40 
 Further, in the clash of rights between religious objectors and members 
of historically persecuted communities, some argue to “beware of the false 
equivalence.”41 Tolerance for religion does not have to mean allowing 
religious people to discriminate against others.42 There is a compelling 
argument that the right not to be discriminated against—claimed by the same-
sex spouses in Masterpiece Cakeshop—is more legitimate than the right to 
discriminate claimed by the baker, even given evidence that one’s right to 
discriminate is being taken away due to religious animus.43  
 
37 See Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 136 (2016) (arguing that using 
the First Amendment to achieve deregulatory goals in the style of Lochner “benefits from a cross-
ideological coalition formed around earlier uses of the First Amendment while allowing Lochner itself to 
remain in the anticanon.”). 
38 See Garrett Epps, The Bogus ‘Free Speech’ Claim Against Unions, ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/the-bogus-free-speech-argument-against-
unions/553205/. Epps believes that Janus is a way for the Supreme Court to dismantle the political power 
of unions, separate from any legitimate First Amendment claims. Id. 
39 Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims 
in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2522 (2015) (“[C]omplicity-based conscience claims have 
become a locus of mobilized political action seeking law reform designed to preserve traditional sexual 
morality.”).  
40 Id. at 2542–43. 
41 See, e.g., Carolina Mala Corbin, Masterpiece Cakeshop: Beware the False Equivalence, TAKE 
CARE (Feb. 12, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/masterpiece-cakeshop-beware-the-false-
equivalence. 
42 Id. (“Tolerating discrimination and tolerating the desire not to be discriminated against are 
simply not the same.”). 
43 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the majority opinion partially based its holding in favor of the baker 
on evidence that the Civil Rights Commission made some inflammatory and potentially animus-based 
comments about religion when deciding whether Colorado’s public accommodations law applied to Jack 
Phillips. Diann Rice, one of the Commissioners, commented that:  
Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout 
history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the Holocaust . . . I mean, we can list hundreds of 
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However, religious adherents may have mobilized as a political group 
because their First Amendment rights are being marginalized by the new, 
good orthodoxy. Further, the Court’s dismantling economic regulation that 
affects speech has long been well intertwined with upholding First 
Amendment liberties, and, indeed, cannot be easily reduced to partisan 
lines.44 
Importantly, the motivation for filing a lawsuit may not be dispositive 
in determining the interpretation of the constitutional provision at stake. Even 
if political, not legal, incentives motivate litigants, the Court retains its duty 
to resolve the legal merits of the dispute using legal frameworks. Of course, 
if an actor’s motive means his conduct is not truly expressive, this may affect 
the resolution of the First Amendment claim. If a Christian baker does not 
generally consider his cakes to be expressive vehicles, but simply does not 
want to serve members of the LBGT community, this should factor into the 
First Amendment analysis. However, determining a litigant’s true motivation 
is difficult, and, if conduct expresses a generally appreciable message, 
casting aspersions on a litigant’s motive should not defeat a free speech 
claim. 
False equivalence arguments, between the right to discriminate and the 
right to be free from discrimination, are also unavailing because the true clash 
of rights in a case like Masterpiece Cakeshop is between the civil right to 
have the state prevent private parties from discriminating against you 
(represented by the public accommodations laws) and the liberty of avoiding 
the state’s coercing you to perform labor that you wish to avoid, which may 
amount to compelled speech (represented by the First Amendment). The 
Christian baker does not want “tolerance” for his ability to discriminate; he 
is instead asserting his civil liberty against state coercion in the form of 
compelled speech.45  
Further, as Professor Richard Epstein argues, the state’s requiring 
someone to choose between his livelihood and his religion is actual coercion, 
whereas there is no legal coercion when a buyer can access goods elsewhere, 
 
situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of 
the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use . . . their religion to hurt others.  
Richard A. Epstein, Linguistic Relativism and the Decline of the Rule of Law, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
583, 585 (2016) (citing Alliance Defending Freedom, Revealed: Colo. Commissioner Compared Cake 
Artist to Nazi (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/9479).  
44 See Kessler, supra note 6, at 1918, 1924–25, 1989. 
45 Although some have argued that this is a case about religion, and the Supreme Court ultimately 
decided this specific case on those grounds, Masterpiece Cakeshop is truly a speech case, precisely 
because of the interaction between Barnette and Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 
(1990), which held that neutral, generally applicable laws that burden speech do not violate the free 
exercise clause. See Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory 
of the First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251, 313–16 (2000); see also infra Part III.A. 
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just not at her preferred seller.46 There is no rights-based harm, according to 
Epstein, from refusing to serve someone in a competitive marketplace 
because we do not have the right to someone else’s labor. That person can go 
elsewhere for a cake, unlike the seller, who must choose between his religion 
and his livelihood.47 
If the clash of rights is framed this way, a case like Masterpiece 
Cakeshop looks a lot more like Barnette. If LGBT individuals can simply get 
cakes elsewhere, then what Colorado’s public accommodations law is doing 
is forcing a Christian baker to acknowledge the “dignity” of the LGBT 
community, which looks like more of a forced ceremony of tolerance and 
respect in the same way saluting the flag is a show of national unity and pride. 
However, if instead, public accommodations laws serve necessary economic 
functions, where “some citizens are singled out to bear significant costs of 
another’s religious exercise”48 or exercise of First Amendment rights, these 
“good orthodoxy” cases look very different than Barnette.  
Ultimately, the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop based its opinion on the 
case-specific religious animus demonstrated by the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission. Concurrences by Justices Kagan and Gorsuch articulated 
different views as to how a civil rights commission must treat blank cakes, if 
the commission allows other bakers to refuse to create anti-gay cakes.49 The 
compelled speech elements were not resolved in the majority opinion, and 
this Essay will later address how future Courts should handle these issues.50  
B. Public Universities and Diversity Statements 
Both the constitutionally-afforded rights and constitutionally-permitted 
powers of the university, and the context in which university decision-
making takes place, illuminate why requiring professors to write diversity 
statements may implicate some of the concerns articulated in Barnette.  
Public universities enjoy academic freedom, but the state institutions 
must also respect the academic freedom rights of their professors, derived 
 
46 Epstein, supra note 43, at 585–86 (“The ability to attribute coercive behavior to the victims of 
coercion is one dire consequence of this massive breakdown in the English language.”). 
47 Id. at 586 (“Note the relative sacrifices. In a competitive market, dozens of other cake shops 
can, and will, serve this couple. But the proprietor who is forced to either go out of business or suffer 
reeducation has no such luxury in responding to government commands.”).  
48 Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 39, at 2521. 
49 See Erica Goldberg, SCOTUS Term: The Scope of Masterpiece Cakeshop Will Be Determined 
by the Concurrences, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 4, 2018), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/06/scotus-term-the-scope-of-the-masterpiece-
cakeshop-decision-will-be-determined-by-the-concurrences.html. 
50 See infra Part III.A. 
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from both the First Amendment and professional norms.51 This tension 
becomes apparent in the context of issues surrounding diversity measures to 
include members of historically underrepresented groups. The Supreme 
Court has held that public universities’ academic freedom rights allow them 
to implement affirmative action plans that involve some racial discrimination 
against majority applicants in order to create diversity that enhances 
classroom discussion and the classroom experience.52 Thus, despite the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, affirmative action may 
properly be employed to further the legitimate pedagogical goals of an 
institution.53 As an extension of this, and to serve important pedagogical 
values, public universities often ask professors to demonstrate that they are 
fostering an environment that allows underrepresented minorities to feel 
welcome and included.  
Many public universities require diversity statements as part of the 
faculty hiring or promotion process. As examples, the University of 
California San Diego asks that professors provide a statement to “describe 
your past efforts, as well as future plans to advance diversity, equity and 
inclusion. It should demonstrate an understanding of the barriers facing 
women and underrepresented minorities and of UC San Diego’s mission to 
meet the educational needs of our diverse student population..”54 At Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, “candidates should include a list 
of activities that promote or contribute to inclusive teaching, research, 
outreach, and service.”55 The University of Cincinnati has announced that 
“[f]aculty and administrative/professional applicants will be asked to submit 
a personal statement summarizing his or her contributions (or potential 
 
51 Professional and constitutional academic freedom rights are not entirely coextensive. Private 
universities and public universities generally respect ethical academic freedom rights, whereas public 
universities must respect academic freedom to the extent it is enshrined in the First Amendment. Grutter 
tells us that institutions have their own academic freedom rights which may conflict with individual 
professor’s and student’s academic freedom rights. See Erica Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring “A 
Degree of Deference”: Institutional Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 217, 221–23 (2011) (offering some solutions to “the conflict between the institutional academic 
freedom rights of the university and the individual academic freedom rights of its faculty” that analyze 
whether a decision is truly academic and which party possesses the academic expertise to resolve the 
decision). 
52 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003). 
53 Id. at 325 (“Rather, ‘[t]he diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far 
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though 
important element.’” (quoting Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978))). 
54 Center for Diversity & Inclusion, Contributions to Diversity Statements, UNIV. OF CAL. SAN 
DIEGO, http://facultydiversity.ucsd.edu/recruitment/contributions-to-diversity.html.  
55 OFFICE OF THE EXEC. VICE PRESIDENT AND PROVOST, VIRGINIA TECH GUIDELINES FOR 
PROMOTION AND TENURE DOSSIERS FOR 2015-2016 (2015), 
https://www.provost.vt.edu/content/dam/provost_vt_edu/promotion_tenure/promotion_and_tenure_guid
elines_2015-16.pdf 
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contributions) to diversity, inclusion and leadership.”56 Some universities 
allow professors to fulfill the diversity statement’s goals by belonging to a 
historically underrepresented group.57 
Although Grutter held that serving and maintaining a diverse population 
is a legitimate pedagogical goal of an academic institution, many have argued 
that mandated diversity statements force professors to swear loyalty to a 
particular view of diversity that maps onto political ideology in a way that 
resembles the unconstitutional loyalty oaths that professors had to sign in the 
1940s and 1950s.58 Universities, they argue, should not (and perhaps cannot 
if they are public universities) mandate that every professor share the same 
views of the importance of specific types of diversity that track membership 
in underrepresented groups, as opposed to emphasizing or prioritizing 
diversity of ideas or experiences, or even other legitimate, critical academic 
values that may exist in tension with the stated goal of diversity.59 Even more 
so, universities should not force professors to proclaim allegiance to a 
particular ideological, and perhaps partisan, view of how to foster diversity 
and inclusion, one that favors focusing on group membership, group benefits 
and penalties, and generalizations about how membership in particular 
groups affects our status, interactions, and opportunities.60 Requiring 
professors to demonstrate adherence to a particular view of diversity in their 
scholarship is even more troubling, from an academic freedom perspective. 
There are ways to require these sorts of statements that may not be 
constitutionally problematic. Some implementations of this goal, however, 
may cross a constitutional line into mandating hegemony of viewpoint on 
how to resolve racial inequalities.61 At some point, the measures designed to 
 
56 See Brittany Harris, A Point of View: Hiring for Inclusion, INCLUSION SOLUTION (June 23, 
1016), http://www.theinclusionsolution.me/a-point-of-view-hiring-for-inclusion/; Jon Miltimore, 
‘Diversity and Inclusion’ Statements Required on Campus, INTELL. TAKEOUT (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.intellectualtakeout.org/blog/diversity-and-inclusion-statements-required-campus. 
57 See OREGON ASSOCIATION OF SCHOLARS, supra note 10 (“At Carnegie Mellon University . . . 
candidates can also pass the litmus test if they ‘represent a historically underrepresented group in [their] 
field based on [their] race, ethnicity, or gender.”). 
58 See Walter E. Williams, College Diversity Statements the New Loyalty Oath, REFLECTOR.COM 
(Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.reflector.com/Op-Ed/2017/04/10/Metastasizing-Academic-
Cancer.html?fullsize=1&item=. According to Williams, “[c]ollege diversity agendas are little more than 
a call for ideological conformity. Diversity only means racial, sex and sexual orientation quotas. . . . The 
last thing that diversity hustlers want is diversity in ideas.” Id. 
59 See Colleen Flaherty, Making a Statement on Diversity Statements, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 
12, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/11/12/former-harvard-deans-tweet-against-
required-faculty-diversity-statements-sets-debate. 
60 See Leef, supra note 10 (“[I]nstead of having to pledge support for America in its battle against 
communism, the new pledge is support to the ‘diversity’ agenda in its battle against a color-blind nation 
where people are evaluated on their own merits rather than group membership.”). 
61 Professors Robert Post and Erwin Chemerinsky have debated in popular media the extent to 
which the First Amendment is relevant at public universities. See Robert C. Post, There Is No First 
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foster the legitimate pedagogical goal of diversity evolve into advancing a 
partisan view of how to achieve particular social justice aims, not how to 
educate. The context in which diversity statements are required heightens the 
ways in which these mandated statements may be compelled speech.  
Universities are already criticized, often by their own leaders, for 
imposing ideological hegemony and creating students who are intolerant of 
opposing views.62 Forced attendance at certain events where students must 
accept and participate in political or ideological accounts of the world have 
been criticized by civil libertarians and by students.63 Some professional 
schools have been denounced as indoctrinating students within a particular 
ideology, and politicians capitalize on these concerns to remove funding from 
state universities, further threatening academic freedom.64  
To be sure, the punishing of professors and students for views the 
administration finds objectionable spans the political spectrum.65 However, 
academia in general is much more liberal than the general population. Law 
school professors are even more liberal than the population of lawyers, which 
is already more liberal than the average American.66 Some studies indicate 
 
Amendment Right to Speak on a College Campus, VOX (Dec. 31, 2017, 11:33 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16526442/first-amendment-college-campuses-milo-
spencer-protests; Erwin Chemerinsky, Hate Speech Is Protected Free Speech, Even on College Campuses, 
VOX (Dec. 26 2017, 4:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16524832/campus-free-
speech-first-amendment-protest. Although there are some open questions at the margins, the Supreme 
Court, at least, has described some aspects of university life as involving a limited public forum, and some 
as involving a traditional public forum. In either of these types of forum, a state university cannot 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (barring 
viewpoint discrimination in the application of a student activities fee that funds publications). 
62 See, e.g., John Etchemendy, Speech before the Stanford Board of Trustees: ‘The Threat From 
Within’, (Transcript of excerpt available at https://news.stanford.edu/2017/02/21/the-threat-from-
within/). In a speech the former provost of Stanford University noted that, “Over the years, I have watched 
a growing intolerance at universities in this country – not intolerance along racial or gender lines – there, 
we have made laudable progress. Rather, a kind of intellectual intolerance, a political one-sidedness, that 
is the antithesis of what universities should stand for.” Id. 
63 See Carrie Pritt, Diversity for the Sake of Democracy, QUILETTE (Jan. 24, 2017), 
http://quillette.com/2017/01/24/diversity-for-the-sake-of-democracy/. 
64 See Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, Elitists, Crybabys, and Junky Degrees, WASH. POST (Nov. 
25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2017/11/25/elitists-crybabies-and-junky-
degrees/?utm_term=.df497fd4e233. 
65 See, e.g., Adam Steinbaugh, Professor Fired For Defending Black Lives Matter on Fox News 
Files Lawsuit, FIRE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.thefire.org/professor-fired-for-defending-black-lives-
matter-on-fox-news-files-lawsuit/; The Editorial Board, A Jesuit School Gets Dogmatic: Is Marquette’s 
Promise of Academic Freedom Worth Anything?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2018, 4:56 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-jesuit-school-gets-dogmatic-1515362173?mod=rss_opinion_main. 
66 Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Kyle Rozema, & Maya Sen, The Legal Academy’s Ideological 
Conformity, J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2953087. The study’s authors argue that although 
the legal academy is more liberal than the population of lawyers, even after controlling for relevant identity 
characteristics, any solution to this problem may compromise other values. Id. (discussing “some 
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that this is due to viewpoint discrimination in hiring, demonstrated by the fact 
that conservative academics outperform the median academic.67 It is only 
human to judge as more academically rigorous or useful the ideas with which 
one agrees,68 but academics must either fight against this urge or lose their 
claim to academic credibility. Further, at public universities, viewpoint 
discrimination in hiring violates the First Amendment.69 
Academic institutions, in other contexts, are increasingly perceived to 
have failed to impart broad-mindedness and intellectual openness on their 
students, perhaps due to social justice aims these institutions believe are more 
important. In our current polarized political climate, students routinely call 
for speakers, especially those with more conservative views, to be disinvited 
from speaking on campus, even when invited by student groups at public 
universities with their own First Amendment rights.70 Many of these calls 
conflate people with ideas that are more conservative, or less obviously 
progressive, even on economic issues, with people who are overtly racist or 
white supremacists.71  
 
suggestive evidence that a tradeoff between ideological balance and diversity-oriented hiring prerogatives 
likely exist”). 
67 James C. Phillips, Why Are There So Few Conservatives and Libertarians in Legal Academia? 
An Empirical Exploration of Three Hypothesis, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153, 196–97 (2016). For an 
alternative take, see Michael Vitello, Liberal Bias in the Academy: Overstated and Undervalued, 77 MISS. 
L.J. 507, 510 (2007) (acknowledging “that law faculties may be further left than the legal profession as a 
whole, but the data do not support the conclusion that law faculties tilt far to the left.”). 
68 Indeed, an empirical study of political contributions concludes that legal scholarship displays a 
political bias, thus undermining the “objectivity” of legal scholarship and the academic endeavor. See 
Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, An Empirical Study of Political Bias in Legal Scholarship, 44 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 277 (2015). Of course, those who donate to political campaigns may be more likely to display 
political bias in their legal scholarship than those wishing to avoid partisan affiliations. See id. at 291–92 
(noting the likelihood “that most nondonors have political commitments, and as a result we decided to 
take an alternative approach to identifying the ideology of the law professors in our sample. The approach 
we elected to use was to code their ideology using information available on their curriculum vitae 
(CVs).”).  
69 At least some aspects of a public university have been considered by the Supreme Court to be 
a public forum, and viewpoint discrimination is impermissible even in a limited public forum. See Epstein, 
supra note 43. 
70 The calls to disinvite Christina Hoff Sommers when invited by the Lewis and Clark Law School 
Federalist Society are illustrative. Lewis and Clark is a private university and is not constitutionally 
required to respect students’ free speech rights, but the example shows an increasing intolerance to any 
views deemed to oppose the interests of women or historically oppressed minority groups. Christina Hoff 
Summers, due to her views about how to tackle the wage gap or handle campus sexual assault cases, was 
labeled a “fascist” by several affinity student groups. See Christina Sommers (@CHSommers), TWITTER 
(Mar. 5, 2018, 8:55 AM), https://twitter.com/CHSommers/status/970704358001094656. 
71 These calls likely do not represent the majority of students, but chanting “liberalism is white 
supremacy” as a way of shouting down a speaker from the American Civil Liberties Union at a planned 
event reflects an atrophying free speech culture on campus. See The Intolerant Fifth: Free Speech at 
American Universities Is Under Threat, ECONOMIST (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.economist.com/united-
states/2017/10/12/free-speech-at-american-universities-is-under-threat. 
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Articulating any sort of causal claim about the increasing intolerance of 
students and the lack of intellectual diversity on university campuses is 
difficult and beyond the scope of this paper. This context is important, 
however, for understanding the First Amendment concerns associated with 
requiring prospective or current faculty to articulate their views about 
diversity in order to be hired or retain their positions. 
Without detracting from any legitimate academic mission of the 
university, some professors may believe in a more classical liberal 
understanding of racial justice and nondiscrimination, in which members of 
all groups have shared, universal rights, and where too much of an emphasis 
on achieving group-based diversity, making group-based generalizations, or 
targeting group-based remediation is both divisive and unfair. The Oregon 
Association of Scholars argues that the “threat to academic freedom and 
research excellence is acute,” when diversity statements are imposed upon 
university faculty, because these statements function as an “ideological 
litmus test.”72 Indeed, university professors advising on how to craft a 
diversity statement have told prospective applicants that they need not apply 
if they do not share the university’s particular definition of and approach to 
diversity.73 According to the White Paper of the Oregon Association of 
Scholars:  
While in theory, the concepts of diversity, equity, and 
inclusion could be interpreted in ways consistent with 
different political viewpoints, in practice they have been 
consistently and exclusively defined by university officials 
to emphasize the values and assumptions of left-wing 
viewpoints in society. These can be summarized as an 
emphasis on group identity; an assumption of group 
victimization; and a claim for group-based entitlements. 
Classical liberal approaches, that emphasize the pluralism of 
a free society, the universalism of human experiences, and 
the importance of equality before the law, have been 
regarded as invalid. So too have conservative approaches 
that focus on shared values and the sacredness of the private 
realm and individual morality. More broadly, the idea of a 
university as a place where leading scholars are protected 
from any ideological imposition is also rejected.74 
These objections cannot be dismissed on the ground that professional 
speech can be more heavily regulated than other speech, or that faculty 
 
72 OREGON ASSOCIATION OF SCHOLARS, supra note 10, at 5. 
73 Id. at 4–5. 
74 Id. at 4. 
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members are frequently asked to express views, through voting or otherwise, 
that are ultimately not accepted by an institution. First, academic freedom 
principles dictate that the lower constitutional scrutiny afforded the speech 
of government employees is likely inapplicable to university professors.75 
The teaching and scholarship of professors are more tightly connected to 
critical First Amendment ideals than the speech of, for example, a doctor, 
which is bound up in the conduct of performing a medical examination.76  
Second, diversity statements are different than the expression of a 
faculty member’s opinion that the administration ultimately rejects, such as 
a vote on hiring or a curricular issue or a controversial statement at a faculty 
meeting. The faculty member must complete the diversity statement, whereas 
she can always abstain from voting or refrain from speaking—and there is 
great pressure to echo the views of the administration, in part because of the 
mandatory nature of the statements. A faculty member understands that her 
job depends on successful communication on the form, yet she is also being 
asked for her opinion on a heavily contested and political issue. 
Objections to mandated diversity statements can perhaps be dismissed 
as advanced by those seeking to undermine the university’s legitimate 
mission of enhancing diversity, sanctioned by Grutter. However, if a public 
university’s true goal in requiring these sorts of diversity statements is to 
increase minority presence in order to remedy past discrimination, that 
political goal is not permitted under Grutter, which explicitly based its 
holding on a diversity of viewpoints and experiences rationale as the 
compelling interest justifying state discrimination.77 If a university’s true 
goal is to serve a variety of students in order to expose students to a diverse 
range of ideas, the permissible compelling interest in Grutter that validated 
race-based affirmation action despite Equal Protection challenges by those 
applicants discriminated against in admissions, most are not doing a 
 
75 According to the Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos: 
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction 
implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s 
customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether 
the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to 
scholarship or teaching. 
547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006). 
76 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our 
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us 
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”). 
77 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323–24 (2003) (describing the precedents’ rejection of “an 
interest in remedying societal discrimination because such measures would risk placing unnecessary 
burdens on innocent third parties ‘who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the 
special admissions program are thought to have suffered” (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978))).  
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commendable job, given the lack of political, intellectual, and ideological 
diversity at most universities.  
Universities may be basing their diversity statements on either an 
unconstitutional or a pretextual purpose. Or, universities may simply be 
ensuring that all students are treated fairly, given data showing race- and 
gender-based implicit bias in evaluating individuals. However, forcing 
professors to articulate specific views placing a high priority on specific types 
of diversity to advance a specific understanding of diversity, using specific, 
often remedial measures that target students for disparate treatment does 
appear to implicate the concerns articulated in Barnette. Professors should be 
empowered to articulate meaningful disagreements on this important topic, 
in order to find the right solutions for best educating students and advancing 
knowledge, the legitimate pedagogical goals of a university. Even if the 
university is permissibly committed to a particular goal, it must leave room 
for other professors to disagree—or progress will come to a halt in the service 
of good orthodoxy.  
In the next section, I explore arguments for and against applying 
Barnette to cases like the ones above, where the state’s laws or university 
policies are designed to promote the rights of minorities, not the populist 
cause of nationalism.  
III.  APPROACHING MODERN APPLICATIONS OF BARNETTE 
Compelled unanimity of opinion is unconstitutional under Barnette. The 
government can articulate its own message, and it has greater leeway to 
control professional speech that is related to professional conduct and the 
provision of professional services,78 and commercial advertising.79 However, 
the government generally cannot require private parties to profess views upon 
 
78 The Supreme Court has not provided guidance on the standard with which professional speech 
should be judged, and lower courts have split on the issue. See Erika Schutzman, We Need Professional 
Help: Advocating for a Consistent Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate 
the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2019, 2023 (2015) (“Some courts have held that professional advice 
does not even qualify as speech under the First Amendment, while others have found that professional 
advice receives the heightened First Amendment protection of intermediate scrutiny.”). Claudia Haupt 
argues that professional speech is worthy of First Amendment protection, regardless of the profession, 
based on “three core elements: (1) a knowledge community’s insights, (2) communicated by a professional 
within the professional-client relationship, (3) for the purpose of providing professional advice. The first 
element concerns the role of knowledge communities.” Claudia Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE 
L.J. 1238, 1247–48 (2016). 
79 Even in the context of commercial advertising, however, some messages the government wishes 
the seller to convey may be struck down as unconstitutional. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“We recognize that unjustified or unduly 
burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial 
speech. But we hold that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements 
are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”). 
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which the state wishes to communicate consensus. The scenarios described 
in the previous Part all implicate the imposition of a “good orthodoxy,” to 
varying degrees.  
However, the “collision of rights” aspect of the good orthodoxy cases 
described above distinguishes them from Barnette. One way to acknowledge 
this distinction is to conclude, consistent with First Amendment protections, 
that the expression of pure, protected speech,80 which merits strict scrutiny, 
does not violate anyone’s rights, thus avoiding a collision, even if the speech 
is offensive and corrosive to historically marginalized groups.81 But laws 
affecting expressive conduct (not pure speech) that undermine the civil rights 
of others may survive constitutional scrutiny, as long as speech and 
expression are not greatly curtailed, and as long as the legislation is not 
designed to achieve a good orthodoxy. This paradigm requires courts to (1) 
recognize when speech is pure speech versus expressive conduct, (2) 
determine whether laws affecting expressive conduct are too restrictive, and 
(3) consider whether the motive of the legislature has aspects that are 
intended to compel unanimity of opinion. 
A. Defining Speech 
Although some frame the issues presented in Masterpiece Cakeshop as 
primarily implicating religious liberty,82 at heart, similar cases should be 
considered compelled speech cases. Masterpiece Cakeshop involved what 
the Supreme Court deemed explicit religious animus and disparate treatment 
on the basis of religion, but similar cases involving expressive rights and 
public accommodations laws need not necessarily implicate religious 
animus. Those cases should be considered, at heart, about free speech rights. 
Barnette itself established a framework where protections against compelled 
speech and unanimity of opinion apply equally to religious claimants and 
those espousing any other ideology.83 Justice Jackson’s majority opinion 
 
80 As noted earlier, I mean to distinguish this type of speech from expressive conduct or speech 
that falls within an unprotected or less protected category. See Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates 
v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
81 This accords with First Amendment jurisprudence, where even speech that is degrading to 
particular identity groups is protected. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (finding 
unconstitutional as a First Amendment violation the Lanham Act’s “disparagement clause,” which denies 
trademarks to marks that demean particular groups). 
82 Indeed, the very narrow opinion ruled on religious liberty grounds, see supra Part II.A., but the 
difficult questions about the interaction between public accommodations laws and the First Amendment 
remain open. 
83 Bybee, supra note 45, at 328–29 (arguing that, because of the jurisprudence of Justices Jackson 
and Scalia, “the First Amendment protects religious exercise from regulation as a religious exercise, 
speech from regulation as speech, and press from regulation as press, but that the First Amendment does 
not grant special privileges to persons exercising such freedoms.”). 
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opted not to hold that religious adherents receive an exemption from 
generally applicable laws; instead, the opinion held that the state does not 
have the power to compel certain forms of expression, regardless of the 
identity of the speaker.84 If the state cannot require the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
to salute the flag, it cannot require anyone to salute the flag.85 
Thus, the religious aspects of Barnette are immaterial to the majority’s 
reasoning, and Barnette is explicitly about state power to regulate speech for 
all. Given that the essence of issues presented in cases like Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, and in a case like Janus, involve free speech rights, not religious 
liberty, a court confronting a similar case must first decide whether the 
legislation at issue affects pure speech or expressive conduct (or, simply 
conduct, in which case there is no First Amendment protection at all). 
Content-based restrictions on pure speech must survive strict scrutiny,86 a 
highly protective standard that should not be lightly diluted even in the 
service of important civil rights goals.87 Restrictions on expressive conduct 
receive intermediate scrutiny, rendering laws valid so long as they are 
appropriately tailored to an important government interest and do not overly 
burden expression.88 
Distinguishing pure speech from expressive conduct, at the margins, is 
not an easy task.89 Articulating a pithy formula for distinguishing pure speech 
 
84 Id. at 329–30. According to the Court in Barnette: 
Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one’s possession of particular religious views or the sincerity 
with which they are held. While religion supplies appellees’ motive for enduring the discomforts of 
making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share these religious views hold such a 
compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual. It is not necessary to inquire 
whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute unless we first find power to 
make the salute a legal duty. 
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634–35 (1943). 
85 Bybee, supra note 45, at 328–30. 
86 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (“Because the Town’s Sign Code 
imposes content-based restrictions on speech, those provisions can stand only if they 
survive strict scrutiny, ‘which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers 
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”) (internal quotations omitted). 
87 The balancing framework’s subjectivity can erode free speech rights, making it all the more 
important that strict scrutiny remain strict. See Goldberg, supra note 24, at 688 & n.2 (arguing that the 
indeterminacy of harms balancing in First Amendment law “has the potential to undermine strong free 
speech protections and our faith in neutral principles underlying the First Amendment.”).  
88 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[A] government regulation is 
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important 
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”). Expressive conduct occurs when “‘speech’ and ‘non-speech’ 
elements” combine in a single act. Id. at 376. 
89 Something like writing a poem is obviously pure speech, and something like burning a draft 
card or nude dancing clearly involves expressive conduct, but activities like cake making and photograph 
taking for commercial purposes fall somewhere in between these delineated extremes. 
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from expressive conduct may prove impossible, but factors the courts could 
consider include the extent to which the expression is part of other heavily 
regulated conduct; the extent to which the medium is generally used to 
communicate a range of ideas, facts, and opinions; the intent of the speaker; 
and the extent to which reasonable people perceive the conduct as expressive. 
Courts examining behavior that may be expressive conduct analyze whether 
the government is regulating the conduct in order to control the content90 and 
whether a reasonable observer would attribute a specific message to the 
speaker.91 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop majority opinion did not address whether a 
blank cake is pure speech or expressive conduct. Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, would have held that a blank cake is 
expressive conduct; he would have applied strict scrutiny to the 
Commission’s decision regardless because, according to this concurrence, 
“Colorado would not be punishing Phillips if he refused to create any custom 
wedding cakes; it is punishing him because he refuses to create custom 
wedding cakes that express approval of same-sex marriage.”92 
Instead, I believe the O’Brien test applied to expressive conduct is the 
appropriate test for the cake at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Colorado’s 
public accommodations law does not target viewpoint but ensures equal 
access of goods and services in the marketplace regardless of sexual 
orientation.93 A blank wedding cake does contain expressive elements, and 
 
90 In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court assumed flag burning was expressive conduct and held 
that the government may not regulate this activity for the purpose of controlling the message. 491 U.S. 
397, 407 (1989). “It is, in short, not simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the expression, but the 
governmental interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid.” 
Id. at 406–07. 
91 Id. at 404 (“In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative 
elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether an intent to convey a 
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
92 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1746 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
93 Justice Thomas believes that in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the state’s compulsion was related to 
the suppression of expression, because the Commission “would not be punishing Phillips if he refused to 
create any custom wedding cakes; it is punishing him because he refuses to create custom wedding cakes 
that express approval of same-sex marriage.” Id. I do not believe this is the correct locus for analysis. The 
law at issue’s purpose, including as applied to this case, is to secure goods for same-sex couples as easily 
as opposite-sex couples, and this purpose is unrelated to the suppression of expression. However, I agree 
with Justice Thomas that purposes of preventing cake sellers from “denigrating the dignity of same-sex 
couples, asserting their inferiority and subjecting them to humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment,” 
id., is related to the communicative element of the expressive conduct and may not be considered in the 
O’Brien analysis. For further discussion on this point, see infra Part III.B. 
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the history and use of the wedding cake connect it to a rich and symbolic 
expressive tradition.94 
However, this type of expressive conduct may withstand O’Brien 
scrutiny—especially if a civil rights commission’s goal is not to compel a 
particular message but to ensure equal access to the marketplace. In future 
cases involving different levels of expression of the cake, the O’Brien test 
should yield different results depending on how much speech is being 
suppressed. This would represent a reading of O’Brien where, the greater the 
intrusion on expression, the larger the interest the government would need to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny, as opposed to the reading that appears on 
the face of the test—which is that if there is any intrusion on speech, the 
government must simply tailor that intrusion narrowly to serve its significant 
interest without unduly intruding upon expression.95 
Cakes as art span an expressive continuum. The writing on a cake, if 
conveying a unique message,96 likely should be considered pure speech, as 
should expressive media like photographs and paintings that do not involve 
heavily regulated conduct elements involving the preparation and cooking of 
food. On the other end of the spectrum, the pre-fabricated cakes produced 
without a customer in mind should be considered pure conduct. A blank cake, 
produced in a custom-made, artistic way, likely contains enough expressive 
elements to be expressive conduct, not pure conduct.  
Although a blank, custom-made wedding cake is expressive conduct, 
important legislative goals unrelated to the suppression of expression will 
withstand O’Brien scrutiny. A blank custom-made cake contains so many 
conduct-like elements, is produced by a heavily regulated industry, and is 
usually produced for consumption, not artistic communication. Plus, the 
application of the expressive conduct test demonstrates that very little speech 
appreciable by a reasonable observer would be compelled by requiring bakers 
to offer cakes on the same terms to all customers. This application of the 
expressive conduct test further illustrates why a blank cake should not be 
considered speech, but expressive conduct, in the first place. As a result, if 
Masterpiece Cakeshop had not been decided based on a religious animus 
 
94 See Brief for Petitioners at 6–7, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 at *1 (describing history of creating “special” 
wedding cakes and their role in the cake-cutting ceremony). 
95 This would give some teeth to the O’Brien inquiry, which is currently being applied in many 
jurisdictions in a highly deferential way. See Ben’s Bar v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 714 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (concluding that O’Brien is nearly indistinguishable from the deferential time, place, and 
manner scrutiny of content-neutral restrictions on speech). 
96 Whether “Happy wedding!” is truly a unique message if written on almost every cake is a 
difficult question, but “I support this same-sex (or opposite-sex) union,” or “I don’t support this same-sex 
(or opposite-sex) union,” should likely be considered pure speech or expressive enough to survive O’Brien 
scrutiny. 
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rationale, I believe that an expressive conduct paradigm should have upheld 
Colorado’s public accommodations law—if the purpose of the law was 
unrelated to the suppression or compulsion of expression.  
Professors Volokh and Carpenter argue in an amicus brief that the use 
of non-traditional media removes First Amendment protection entirely unless 
conduct is “intended to and likely to convey a . . . message.” 97 Their brief 
does not directly track the differences between pure speech and expressive 
conduct, but I agree with their approach that a custom-designed, non-
prefabricated wedding cake may implicate free speech protections if it 
communicates a clear message.98 In my view, those types of cakes should be 
considered expressive conduct, not removed entirely from the ambit of First 
Amendment protection.  
Applying the O’Brien scrutiny in the way I have proposed would 
invalidate laws that restrict more speech, such as cases involving more 
traditional media of expression or cases where the cake contained a true 
message or symbolic design details.99 The intermediate scrutiny of O’Brien 
would allow the application to nondiscrimination laws in cases like 
Masterpiece Cakeshop but would leave open the possibility of a different 
result in cases that implicated and compelled more speech. 
Future courts dealing with cases of expressive conduct must also decide 
whether a reasonable observer would attribute a cake to the baker, or simply 
to the purchaser, before even applying expressive conduct protections. As 
Justice Gorsuch notes in his concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the 
approach courts use to decide whether, for example, a custom-made cake is 
protected speech must stay consistent across all cakes.100 Serious First 
 
97 See Brief for American Unity Fund & Profs. Dale Carpenter & Eugene Volokh as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4918194, at *14 (arguing that articles sold to consumers that use media 
traditionally associated with expression should be considered pure speech).  
98 Volokh and Carpenter appear to argue that many custom-made cakes will not communicate a 
clear message, and I would disagree with that application of their approach. Id. at *19. 
99 Only one of the concurrences in Masterpiece Cakeshop address how the case would be decided 
if words were written on the cake. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719, 1744 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). I can imagine a cake that says, simply, “Congratulations,” 
might be treated differently, for First Amendment purposes, than a cake that says, “Congratulations on 
your same-sex union” because the baker in the first scenario is not forced to write something he wouldn’t 
articulate on cakes to opposite-sex couples. However, this argument is better suited to whether a baker 
impermissibly discriminated based on customer identity or permissibly refused service based on 
ideological message, which is not protected by Colorado’s public accommodations law. 
100 See id. at 1736–37 (describing how the Commission treated bakers’ refusals to create cakes 
denigrating same-sex marriage differently than Petitioner’s refusal to create a cake celebrating same-sex 
marriage). But see Erica Goldberg, The Scope of the Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision Will Be Determined 
by the Concurrences, CROWDED THEATER (June 4, 2018), https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2018/06/04/the-
scope-of-the-masterpiece-cakeshop-decision-will-be-determined-by-the-concurrences/ (outlining Justice 
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Amendment issues would arise if a civil rights commission deemed a cake’s 
message to be attributable only to the customer in some cases, like those 
involving bakers refusing to create cakes for same-sex weddings, but 
attributable to the baker in other cases, such as if a baker refused to create a 
cake with a message that denounced same-sex marriage. I believe it is fair to 
attribute the message on a cake to the creator of the cake; any other position 
would likely create a circularity problem where the compulsion renders the 
speech not compelled under the First Amendment. 
Whether a law compels or targets actual speech should be the crux of 
good orthodoxy cases. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Janus, which 
held that union dues for public sector unions constitutionally compel speech, 
truly grapple with whether the union dues contributed are, indeed, speech but 
base their decisions instead on what level of scrutiny attaches to employee 
speech as manifested through union dues.101 The majority invokes Barnette 
several times to demonstrate the perils of forcing people to serve as a 
mouthpiece for the state’s message,102 and the dissent chastises the majority 
for overturning a law simply based on its policy wishes.103 The dissent makes 
a compelling argument that perhaps a lower level of scrutiny should have 
attached to these contributions because of their connection to the employment 
setting and the duties of the employee. The majority is correct that union dues 
are clearly the speech of the employee, not the employer, undermining the 
agency-based rationales for why employee speech is often entitled to less 
First Amendment protection.104  
Ultimately, the operative question, unaddressed by the majority, should 
have been about when mandated dues are the speech of the dues payer. The 
Court should have more closely and directly analyzed whether mandating 
 
Kagan’s conclusion that there is a principled way to distinguish bakers who refuse to sell cakes denigrating 
same-sex marriage from the situation in Masterpiece Cakeshop). 
101 See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2018) 
(discussing the differences between the deferential scrutiny suggested by the dissent and the scrutiny 
applied by the majority). 
102 Id. at 2463–64. 
103 Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “weaponizing the First 
Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and 
regulatory policy.”). For a discussion of why this type of cynicism may be unjustified and is corrosive to 
our First Amendment regime, see Erica Goldberg, First Amendment Cynicism, the Janus Dissent, and the 
Soul of the First Amendment, CROWDED THEATER (July 3, 2018), 
https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2018/07/03/first-amendment-cynicism-the-janus-dissent-and-the-soul-of-
the-first-amendment/. 
104 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (majority opinion). According to Justice Alito:  
When an employee engages in speech that is part of the employee’s job duties, the employee’s words 
are really the words of the employer. . . . But when a union negotiates with the employer or represents 
employees in disciplinary proceedings, the union speaks for the employees, not the employer.  
Id. 
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that public-sector employees give money to a private organization is more 
similar to paying taxes, or even paying a private continuing education 
organization,105 or more similar to classic instances of compelled speech like 
forced donations to a political party. Mandatory union dues seem different 
than continuing legal education, which is truly intended to improve an 
employee’s job performance and thus is more similar to the less-protected 
employee speech, but this is a hard question that should have been the focus 
of the Janus decision. Separating compelled speech from unprotected 
funding or conduct is paramount in good orthodoxy cases.  
In academia, diversity statements have speech-like elements, in that they 
are written statements by academics, describing their teaching, and, at some 
schools, their scholarship. The required statement commits a professor to a 
particular view and approach to scholarship and teaching. As a result, the 
diversity statement requirement compels the statement in itself, which 
professes particular views a professor may feel pressured into expressing, and 
also requires future conformity with the statement in the professor’s teaching 
and scholarship. Both the compulsion to make the statements and the effects 
on teaching and scholarship, based on a school’s preferred approach to a 
politicized topic, implicate aspects of Barnette. 
 Diversity statements, however, also memorialize the conduct-aspects of 
the professor’s employment. Universities should have the right to ensure that 
professors are not discriminating against students or unfairly disadvantaging 
some based on unconscious biases. The simple request for professors to fill 
out diversity statements by public schools may not be constitutionally 
problematic, if a reasonable range of responses and viewpoints are permitted.  
There are situations where diversity statements may become, and 
perhaps have become, problematic, based on professional and even 
constitutional protections for academic freedom. Under at least professional 
and ethical standards of academic freedom—let alone constitutional ones—
faculty members deserve wide latitude to comport their classrooms as they 
see fit, craft reasonable policies involving class participation, and design the 
curriculum to best present the material, without implementing diversity-
based remediation, so long as they do not discriminate against students. The 
institution also has latitude to create diversity-based programming and foster 
an atmosphere of inclusion, and where the university’s and the professor’s 
 
105 An amicus brief analogizes agency fees to taxes and continuing education classes. See Brief 
for Professors Eugene Volokh & William Baude as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Janus v. 
Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2018 WL 527958 at *4–
5, *13 (comparing compelled union dues to taxes and to private organizations to which employees must 
contribute funds). 
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prerogatives conflict, schools should leave a reasonable range of 
experimentation for professors.106  
The Constitution does become relevant if professors at public schools 
are compelled to echo the school’s political viewpoint on issues involving 
diversity. The institution may take a particular position on the best way to 
promote diversity, but faculty must be permitted to disagree. If a professor 
believes that a focus on group differences or group remedies is illiberal, and 
that efforts to achieve diversity become discriminatory and infringe on 
individual students’ rights, the professor cannot be compelled to express a 
different view. This honors the professors’ First Amendment rights, ensures 
that their scholarship is not compromised by forced espousal of views to 
which they do not ascribe, and leaves room for the school’s position to 
evolve.107 
B. Impermissible Motives, Dignitary Interests, and Unanimity of 
Opinion 
When pure speech and expressive conduct conflict with laws protecting 
historically marginalized groups, Barnette counsels against allowing certain 
governmental motives to override free speech concerns. Barnette’s antipathy 
towards a forced orthodoxy should mean that certain motives—like the 
state’s desire to use individual’s speech to vindicate others’ dignitary 
interests—are insufficient to override First Amendment concerns. The state 
may regulate harmful conduct such as discrimination, which also implicates 
dignitary concerns as well as causing economic harm. However, when the 
state regulates speech or expressive conduct, its motive cannot be mandating 
that others communicate a message of tolerance that affirms the dignity of 
others. That motive, even for what the state believes to be a worthy cause 
 
106 Hard cases in this context span the political spectrum. For example, a graduate-level teacher 
who championed calling on students in an order based on their membership in certain historically 
marginalized groups, saying she calls on white men “[only] if I have to,” see Don Sweeny, This Instructor 
Calls on Black Women First and White Men Last. Critics Want Her Fired, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 23, 2017, 
2:11 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article180416296.html, has 
adopted a strategy that I do not believe is protected by academic freedom, in that she is actively 
discriminating against students in her classroom to remedy social injustice issues outside of the classroom. 
See Goldberg & Sarabyn, supra note 51 (arguing that academic freedom should exist when a professor is 
acting academically, not politically, and defending the distinction). If a university wants to prohibit 
professors from engaging in open discrimination against students, instead of just trying to equalize 
speaking opportunities, it should have that prerogative. 
107 Schools change policies on issues as fundamental as whether to require mandatory 
standardized admissions tests, and professors’ opinions on these issues should be at the forefront of these 
changes. 
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(and perhaps especially because the state believes it to be a worthy cause),108 
tracks the compelled unanimity of opinion that Barnette rejects. 
The government cannot vindicate dignitary interests by capitalizing on 
the communicative value of speech to force others to communicate a message 
of equal dignity. If an artist does not believe that, as an example, Jewish 
people’s beliefs are as wholesome, or as correct, as Christian people’s beliefs, 
the government cannot force that artist to depict messages of tolerance. The 
government cannot force individuals to communicate a message that others 
are worthy of equal dignity, even if that message is right, even if that message 
represents the foundation of our country, and even if the government may 
itself communicate that message and regulate conduct in order to promote 
that message. The concrete, material effects of the regulation can be 
considered when applying intermediate scrutiny to expressive conduct,109 but 
courts should not invalidate statutes based the dignitary harm caused by 
speech. In most cases, when pure speech is involved, strict scrutiny should 
defeat the statute so as to avoid dilution of the strict scrutiny standard that 
would jeopardize our full panoply of First Amendment rights. Thus, even if 
pure speech has concrete, material effects, speech compulsion or prohibition 
should not survive strict scrutiny even if these types of regulations would 
survive intermediate scrutiny.  
At oral argument, the Justices in Masterpiece Cakeshop should thus not 
have focused on dignitary interests—as hard as this is to do.110 Dignity, as an 
interest, is so amorphous as to invite viewpoint-based discrimination, 
antithetical to our viewpoint-neutral free speech regime, by courts and 
legislatures. Further, an opposition to speech that undermines others’ dignity 
for particular reasons or based on particular characteristics is a viewpoint-
based consideration in and of itself. Speech that harms another’s dignity does 
so because the listener is profoundly offended and invalidated by the 
message, or viewpoint, expressed. The Court ruled in Matal v. Tam that the 
Patent and Trademark Office may not refuse to issue trademarks that 
disparage other individuals or groups because the disparagement clause is a 
 
108 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in NIFLA v. Becerra reflected this sentiment, when he 
remarked that “[t]he California Legislature included in its official history the congratulatory statement 
that the Act was part of California’s legacy of forward thinking. But it is not forward thinking to force 
individuals to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view they find 
unacceptable.” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
109 Concrete, material effects include the inability of a certain minority group to obtain access to 
goods and services, an effect produced regardless of the communicative effect of the speech, if a particular 
group is discriminated against in the provision of goods and services. 
110 Justice Kennedy, for example, asked about whether deciding the case in favor of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop would lead to results that are “an affront to the gay community.” Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 27, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
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viewpoint-based restriction on speech.111 Under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state may not target particular groups in 
ways that undermine their dignity and autonomy, but, without state action, 
private individuals are allowed to express ideas that offend others to the very 
core. 
This argument becomes more complicated when discussing requiring 
professors to create diversity statements. Affirming the equal dignity of every 
student, regardless of status characteristics, is a critical part of a professor’s 
job and creates an environment where students can best learn. Professors who 
actively and explicitly make statements to students reflecting racial- or 
gender-based animus are doing their students a disservice, and the school can 
rightly intervene. That said, professors who simply hold different views on 
affirmative action, or speak out against perhaps over-compensatory diversity 
measures, should not be deemed to be undermining the dignity of their 
students. In an academic setting, students need to tolerate views that upset 
them, or even disturb them to their core, especially from other students, and 
perhaps even from professors. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Understanding the modern compelled speech cases in light of Barnette 
can be helpful in bridging the growing political divide between the right and 
the left on free speech issues. Barnette, a case involving opposition to certain 
types of forced patriotism, codes as a left-leaning opinion by those who, for 
simplicity, categorization, or other political purposes, reduce judicial 
opinions to left-right outcomes. Cases similar to Masterpiece Cakeshop will 
code as right-leaning invocations of the First Amendment. However, the 
appreciation that forced unanimity of opinion comes in many forms, and 
undermines the expressive rights of many different groups, may force 
partisans to think about these cases at a higher level of abstraction, above the 
outcome in any particular case.  
The key to ensuring that individuals across the political spectrum can 
accept both the reasoning and the results in any given opinion will be drawing 
clear, meaningful, nonpartisan lines between speech and conduct that 
safeguard our ability to express unpopular sentiments while preserving laws 
that mainly target conduct and benefit groups who have been historically 
oppressed by our country’s laws. 
 
111 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (holding that the Patent and Trademark Office 
violated the First Amendment when it refused to grant a trademark to the band The Slants on the basis 
that the trademark was disparaging to individuals of Asian descent). 
